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PREFACE

This study was concluded and submitted for publication prior to
the tragic death of President Jaime Rold6s in an airplane accident on
May

24, 1981.

The authors feel, however, that the validity of their

analysis is not altered substantially by the unexpected change in political leadership in Ecuador.

In its broad philosophical and programmatic

outlines, the path charted for the Rold6s administration in 1978 and 1979
was very much a joint enterprise between Jaime Rold6s and his vice president, Osvaldo Hurtado, and conformed closely to the diagnoses and analyses publicized by the latter in his extensive historical and socia-political research efforts of the sixties and seventies.

The commitment of

Osvaldo Hurtado to the SOCial, economic, and political reform strategies
of the Rold6s government is further strengthened by virtue of the critical
role in the drafting of the regime's five-year National Development Plan
played by Hurtado who, as vice president of the country, was head of the
government planning agency, the National Development Council.
Upon assuming the presidency, Hurtado went to some lengths to
assure the country that the reform mandate that had swept Rold6s into
office would not be betrayed and that the programs begun by the fallen
president would be continued.

The continuity promised by the new presi-

dent received symbolic reinforcement on June 2 with the election by
congress of Le6n Rold6s, younger brother of the former president, to
the vice presidency for the remaining three years of the original
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five-year term.

Thus, though some personnel and orientational changes

can be expected over the next three years, both the problems and the
strategies advanced to solve them remain essentially unaltered.

The

Hurtado administration, like the one inaugurated by Rold6s, will seek
structural reform within a democratic framework; President Hurtado, like
his predecessor, will be confronted by serious challenges that will call

into question the validity of the development model adopted by the regime.
These are the issues that are addressed by this study.

J.L.
N.D.M.
June 10, 1981

------~
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THE CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRATIC REFORMISM IN ECUADOR
I

Introduction
Ecuador is a small and misdeveloped country that has recently
embarked on an important experiment in national development.

The nature

and outcome of this experiment have implications not only for the social
science researcher, but more importantly for the Ecuadorean people themselves and for developing countries in the region and throughout the
hemisphere.

The administration elected in 1979 has pledged to carry out

a program of far-reaching reform within a democratic framework that will
harmonize economic development and social justice in a way designed to
effect a major transformation of the basic structures and values of the
nation.

It is clear that the reforms proposed will clash with the

country's entrenched heritage of three centuries of unequal social and
economic growth and with a political tradition characterized by autocracy
and authoritarianism.

Many observers vonder whether sufficient resources

of any kind can be mobilized during the four years of the current regime
even to begin to overcome the inertia of imbalanced development, attributed by some to the forces of dependency and by others to structural
l
rigidities inherent in the social relations of production.
On the other
hand, it is true that the conditions in Ecuador today could not be more
propitious to initiate a process of significant transformation:

unprece~

dented revenues from petroleum provide the state with a promising resource
base for reform, the government is led by a new generation of men who
have a profound awareness of the country's past and of its present problems,
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the administration is staffed by a corps of able men and women freed from
the sterile conflicts that once dominated the rhetoric (if not the reality)
of national politics, and the economy has a potential for diversification
that could provide a base for independent development.

How the current

regime capitalizes on these favorable circumstances, its success or
failure in achieving the goals of development and justice, might provide
clues to a clearer analysis of the causes of misdevelopment and to a
clearer understanding of the solutions needed to resolve the development
crises that plague countries throughout the Third World.

President Jaime Rold6s and Vice-President Osvaldo Hurtado were
swept into office in August, 1979, on a tide of enthusiasm and hope.

This

most recent revival of constitutional government ended a nine-year period
of dictatorship that had begun with

Jos~

Maria Velasco Ibarra's autogolpe

of June, 1970, followed two years later by his own ouster at the hands
of a military institution that viewed with alarm the anticipated victory
in the 1972 presidential elections of populist and unpredictable Assad
Bucaram at a time when the petroelum era was beginning to dawn in Ecuador.
General Guillermo Rodriguez Lara's Nationalist Revolutionary Government of
the Armed Forces, inspired by the promise of petroleum-financed socioeconomic reforms, floundered in a miasma of political intrigue and economic
uncertainty, and ultimately provoked a division within the armed forces
themselves,

The resolution of this conflict culminated in the removal of

Rodriguez from office in January, 1976, and his replacement by a military
triumvirate whose exclusive mandate was to extract the armed forces from
politics and to transfer the direction of the government to civilian
leadership.

3

The victory of Rold6s and Hurtado in the second-round elections of
April, 1979, capped a protracted struggle against formidable odds.

Rold6s'

lack of seniority in the CFP party and Christian Democrat Hurtado's wellpublicized animosity toward the populist political style in general and
the CFP and its leader Bucaram in particular, rendered these men unlikely
choices as CFP standardbearers.

However, after Bucaram's aspirations for

the presidency were frustrated by a governmental decree requiring Ecuadorean par.entage for presidents of the republic (the CFP leader's parents
were Lebanese immigrants), Bucaram's nephew, Jaime Rold6s t was selected as
the party's candidate on the basis of his close ties with Bucaram, his
outstanding and loyal service to the party, and his commendable and widely
publicized performance as a member of one of the three legislative commissions established by the military junta to lay the institutional groundwork for the return to constitutional rule.

Hurtado, who was Rold6s'

personal choice as a runningmate, proved to be a credible selection by
virtue of his strength in the highland provinces (to balance that of
Rold6s on the coast) and the considerable affinity existing between the
two men as regards their diagnoses of the country's problems and the
strategies for solving them.

To be sure, both candidates were handicapped

by a relative lack of political experience and a nationwide image.
Hurtado, however, enjoyed perhaps a slight advantage over his ally because of the skillful leadership he demonstrated as chairman of the third
legislative commission that was reponsible for drafting an electoral law
and a law governing political parties for the new constitutional order.
To the problems of youth (Rold6s was 37 and Hurtado 38 at the outset of
the campaign) and inexperience was added that posed by the stature of the
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candidates' principal rival, center-right Frente Nacional Constitucionalista candidate Sixto Duran Ballen.

In addition to his respectable re-

cord as a modernizing mayor of Quito during seven years (1970-1977),
Duran also had in his favor (a dubious asset as it turned out) the full
support of the Guayaquil oligarChy, members of which not only made generous financial contributions to his campaign, but also stumped personally in his behalf.
To erase the populist hues with which they were tainted by virtue
of their CFP sponsorship, and to project instead an image of intelligent
and efficient reflection on the country's basic problems, the CFP candidates
synthesized their ideas for government in the form of a succinct document
titled u21 Bases Programaticas," which outlined a comprehensive program of
industrialization and integrated national development, social equality,
national sovereignty, and educational, fiscal, and administrative reform.
Rold6s and Hurtado carried their message of "La Fuerza del Cambio" to
Ecuadorean citizens throughout the twenty provinces of the country.

They

promised not only a working democracy, but also economic opportunity and
an improved standard of living for all those groups--workers, Indians,
women, disenchanted middle-class youth, marginalized elements--whose share
in the distribution of petroleum-generated social, political, and economic
rewards during the long years of dictatorship had failed to keep pace with
their expectations.
Electoral victory was achieved through a campaign strategy based
on a sober and forthright discussion of key issues, on maturity and
modest self-confidence in the face of personal

attacy~

by the opposition,

and on firmness in response to the numerous attempts to undermine the
electoral process by civilian and military factions alike.

In the July,
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1979, first-round elections

(in accordance with the new electoral law

that required a fifty-plus-one per cent majority for the winning candidate),
the Rold6s-Hurtado ticket led a pack of six candidates with an impressive
28 per cent of the votes cast, followed by Duran with 21 per cent.
Liberal candidate Raul Clemente Huerta came in a close third with 20
per cent of the votes.

The run-off election, held on April 29, result-

ed in an overwhelming victory, with Rold6s winning 62 per cent of the vote,
the first candidate in the history of the country to garner over one
million votes in a national election.

In the parliamentary elections

held at the same time, voters elected CFP candidates to fill thirty of
the sixty-nine seats in the new unicameral legislature.
The decisive victory in the presidential contest represented a
clear mandate for profound change in Ecuadorean society in accordance
with the reformist objectives outlined by the winning candidates during
the campaign.
cr~cy,

Economic development, social justice, and stable demo-

the major themes of the campaign, became the framework for govern-

mental action; indeed, they were destined to become the chief legitimizing features of the new regime.

Though no one doubts the sincerity of

Rold6s-the-candidate in projecting these goals for his government, nonetheless, the prospects of their accomplishment by Rold6s-the-President, given
the current and likely future state of social, economic, and political
affairs in Ecuador, might justifiably give cause for concern.

For the

government inevitably will confront at least two sets of contradicting
forces that even if they do not work at cross purposes to basic policy
objectives, most certainly will greatly curtail effective governmental
actiou toward their fulfillment during the five-year presidential term.
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One important dilemma to be faced by the new regime will be the
compatibility of costly, redistributive-oriented social justice on the
one hand, and broad-based economic development on the other, given the
narrow resource base within which the government perforce must operate.
The administration will be forced to choose between short-term consumption--a sine qua

~

for continuing support by middle-class, worker, and

marginalized sectors--and long-term development strategies based on
accumulation and resource rationalization.

Stated another way, the

dilemma revolves around the question of whether or not the political
costs entailed in inordinate emphasis on long-range development can be
reconciled with the economic costs of policies geared toward short-range
consumption.

Because of the political imperatives inherent in the govern-

mental strategies adopted, in the long run the measure of the regime's
•
success will be the extent to which these two key dimensions can be
harmonized despite the evidence that, given the current state of development in Ecuador, they seem to be, if not mutually exclusive, at least
potentially mutually antagonistic, a reality the consequences of which
were not lost on Per6n's Argentine, Paz Estenssoro's Bolivia, Allende's
Chile, and Castro's Cuba during the early years of the Revolution.

Thus,

considering the potentially contradictory nature of the regime's economic
and social programs, it is entirely possible that the government could
with little difficulty work itself into a hopeless zero sum deadend.
The problem of social change within the state capitalist framework
adopted by the Rold6s regime is only further exacerbated by a rigid social
system that over three centuries has consecrated inequality and has
revealed itself to be remarkable resistant to all but the most superficial
modifications.

It was preCisely the imminent prospect of governmental
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tampering with traditional privileges that inspired the vitriolic and
at times militant opposition by the traditional Sierra-Coast oligarchy
to the Rold6s candidacy.
A second potentially destabilizing element for Ecuador's new
regime is implicit in Rold6s' pledge to consolidate a functional and
enduring democratic order.

While on the surface this might be inter-

preted as an affront to the civic pride of the average Ecuadorean
citizen for whom theoretical republican democracy has been long since
consecrated in the annals of national lore, dating to the first constituent convention of 1830, the president's point is nevertheless not lost
on those who reflect on the endless succession of caudillista- or militaryinspired coups and de facto governments over the country's 150-year history.
Ultimately, the burden of proof will be on Rold6s to demonstrate that
pluralistic democracy is indeed feasible in Ecuador despite the examples
of the past and despite the overwhelming evidence that democratic structures in the country have not proven particularly adaptive to long-term
crisis.

The military interventions of 1925, 1931, and 1963 would seem to

indicate that in the twentieth century the armed forces have not at all
been reluctant to step in at the slightest sign of a breakdown of social
order, ironically enough usually on the pretext of defending Ecuador's
democratic birthright.

Thus, in the final analysis, the country's tenuous

institutional base will only heighten the difficulties to be confronted
by the government in its efforts to implement policies of rapid social
reform and economic development.

The specific framework for some of these

economic, social, and political dilemmas will be discussed on the following pages.
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II

Society and the Economy:

Dilemmas and Alternatives

Social and economic conditions in Ecuador, though in relative
terms much improved after nearly a decade of petroleum-triggered prosperity and change, still reveal many unfavorable characteristics.

In

fact it can be argued that the petroleum boom engendered a model of development that only reinforced the trends toward the concentration of wealth
and status that had been latent in national society ever since the beginning of the republican era.

Quantitatively, the Ecuadorean economy has

experienced unprecedented growth in recent years, with GDP increments
averaging between 10 and 11 per cent per year during the 1970s.

The

dynamics of this spurt of growth have occasioned a considerable reorientation of the national economy.

Greatly increased revenues permitted an

extraordinary growth of public spending and a correspondingly greater
involvement of the state in the national economy.

Manufacturing and fish-

ing were likewise positively affected by the process of accumulation
generated by petroleum.

The traditional sectors of the economy, however,

experienced a diminution of importance in direct proportion to the development and growth of new activities.

Agriculture, for example, has been

progressively surpassed as the economy's principal generator of production, employment, and foreign exchange; at the same time, the impressive
growth of manufacturing has caused a steady erosion of the GOP share of
artisan production in the industrial sector (Gobierno, 1980 1:33).
Thus, despite the affluence of recent years, Ecuador still remains
in many ways a very backward country that is characterized by serious
imbalances and structural shortcomings.

Significant portions of the

.------
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population are economically, socially, and politically marginalized; the
country's dependence on industrialized countries is increasing; foreign
trade remains vulnerable to wild fluctuations in world market price and
demand; and because of the development model followed since the advent of
petroleum, the gap between rich and poor, city and country is widening
(Gobierno, 1980-I:22).
In its five-year development plan, which was signed into law in
March, 1980, the government has identified several key areas where governmental action and the healthy development of the economy are expected to
be hampered as a result of serious economic and administrative dislocations.

The Rold6s administration is aware that social justice will not

be forthcoming without the integrated development of the nation's economy.
To accomplish the dual objectives of economic development and social justice,
however, the government must have sufficient autonomy to ensure an allocation of Ecuador's limited resources in a way that is appropriate to specific
policy objectives outlined in the Plan.

Not only is state autonomy in

question, however; concern is also expressed over recent trends in petroleum,
agriculture, industry, foreign trade, and public sector policy.
Chief among Ecuador's development resources is petroleum, which, at
least for the immediate future, will continue to be the motor force of
the national economy.

Two noteworthy dilemmas to be faced by the regime

in this area will be (1) how to cope with the distorting effects of the
petroleum boom and (2) how to reduce the country's growing dependence
on this rapidly depleting resource.

On the one hand, exports of petro-

leum, now accounting for about 50 per cent of the value of all exports
(El Comercio, August 6, 1979), allows Ecuador to enjoy a strong currency
and unlimited credit abroad, to import capital and consumer goods, and,

--

-
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at least for the moment, to maintain favorable trade balances.

On the other

hand, cheap fuel at the expense of heavy government subsidies has led to
wasteful and rapidly increasing domestic consumption at such a rate
(about 15 per cent yearly) that it is estimated that by 1982, Ecuador's
domestic market will absorb a full 100 per cent of national production
at current levels (Gobierno, 1980 I: 38; IV: 21; Latin American Weekly
Report, March 14, 1980:4).

Between 1979 and 1980, domestic consumption

of petroleum products jumped from 30,000 to 40,000 barrels per day.
Thirty per cent of the national demand for petroleum derivatives must be
imported at a cost of 440,000 dollars daily.
government

Imported oil that costs the

44 dollars a barrel is sold on the local market at a subsidized

price of 8 dollars

(~

Comercio, October 9, 1980).

Thus, despite gener-

ating considerable national wealth and stimulating secondary growth in
other sectors of the economy, petroleum has also engendered a bonanza
mentality that has ultimately led to wild spending and great waste.

Accord-

ing to current estimates, and barring the incorporation into production
of new oil fields, Ecuador's oil reserves will be totally depleted in
fifteen years.

Increasing national demand for electrical energy, 60 per

cent of which derives from thermal sources, places an additional burden
on this already beleaguered resource (Gobierno, 1980 1:38).

Oil, then,

seems to be following the boom-bust course previously traced by cacao
and bananas:

a wave of investment, rapid expansion of capacity, generous

profits for fortunate minorities, free-wheeling speculation, and finally
decline and stagnation.
Coincidental with the growth of petroleum, and linked to it, is
the recent decline in agriculture, particularly in production areas
destined for domestic consumption.

In the period 1969-1971, for example,
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Ecuador produced an annual average of 81,197 metric tons of wheat and
559,470 metric tons of potatoes.

By 1975-1977, production of these

commodities had decreased to 56,482 tons and 483,048 tons respectively.
In 1979, wheat production declined even further to 21,846 tons that were
cultivated on 26,700 hectares of land, one-fourth of that devoted to
wheat production prior to the initiation of petroleum exports only seven
years earlier.

Between 1961 and 1978, the agricultural sector's share

of the GDP declined fourteen percentage points, from 33 per cent to 19
per cent (IBRD, 1979:130; Junta, 1979:Anexo 3).
Production declines in wheat and other staples (such as barley
and oats) are attributable primarily to governmental price controls and
low profits, factors that have produced a flight of capital into more
lucrative areas of the economy such as export agriculture, construction,
industry, and real estate

(~

Comercio, December 19, 1979).

Other data

reveal clearly that domestic market agricultural production, primarily
in rice and fruits, has increased measurably only in the coastal region,
and even there not rapidly enough to satisfy national demand.

Overall

declining production for the domestic market has brought about a situation of great irony wherein agricultural staples have to be imported in
a country where over 50 per cent of the economically active population
still works in agriculture.

Wheat imports, for example, have increased

steadily from 59,000 tons in 1965-1966, to 83,000 tons in
an impressive 240,000 tons in 1978-1979.

1970-l97~,

to

The cost to the government for

wheat imports in the latter year alone amounted to 38.5 million dollars
(~Comercio,

July 3, 1979; December 18, 1979).

Ecuador's agroexport sector, traditionally the mainstay of the
economy, has presented a somewhat mixed picture since the advent of the
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petroleum era.

Though agroexport's relative share in the GDP and in total

export volume has understandably declined, production increases of both
traditional (coffee, cacao, and bananas) and non-traditional (African
palm) commodities, combined with generally favorable market conditions,
have resulted in considerable overall increases in agroexport values, with
increments averaging 73 million dollars annually during the period 19701978 (~Comercio, December 6, 1979).

Thanks largely to the growth of

the export sector, agriculture was able to demonstrate an overall 2 per
cent value added growth rate in 1979 (IDB, 1979:241).

Though the rate had

increased to 2.7 per cent during the first ten months of 1980, it still
was far short of matching population increases of approximately 3.4
per cent (Economia, September, 1980:1).

Over the short term, agricul-

tural stagnation is obviously linked to the dislocations wrought by the
petroleum boom of the seventies.

Long-term structural deficiencies,

however, are equally responsible and, in the view of the current regime,
must be eradicated if the ideal of agricultural self-sufficiency is ever
to be achieved.

Such long-term causes of agrarian stagnation would

include an inefficient land tenure system that tends to concentrate landholdings in a few hands, a proliferation of small, unproductive plots
(minifundismo), anachronistic price mechanisms that force a drain of
resources from rural to urban areas, inappropriate agrarian technologies
that lead to low productivity, underutilization of land, limited financial
and technical resources, and inefficiency of governmental agencies responsible for agrarian and livestock development (Gobierno, 1980 I: 37).
The rapid development of industry in recent years could perhaps
ease the impact of the serious decline in food production and offset the
disasterous effects of a sudden loss of oil revenues.

Using 1970 as a
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base year for an index of growth, manufacturing jumped from 119.77 in
1972 to 253.30 in 1979

(~

Comercio, December 14, 1979).

In percentage

figures, industry grew at an annual rate of 13.2 per cent, and manufacturing at 10.2 per cent during the period 1970-1976.

Between 1961 and

1976, industry's share of the GDP grew from 16 per cent to 36 per cent,
and manufacturing from 14 to 17 per cent (IBRD, 1979:128, 130).

In terms

of specific activities, by far the greatest increases were registered in
the manufacture of metal products, machinery, and equipment, where the
production index rose from 134.86 to 625.49 between 1972 and 1979 (Banco
Central, 1979:150-151).

While agricultural production grew by 371 million

dollars between 1970 and 1978, industry and manufacturing achieved a
gain of almost 600 million dollars in the same period (Junta, 1979:Anexo
1).

Though the growth of this sector is expected to continue for the

foreseeable future, the extent and rate of growth will be highly dependent
on factors both internal and external to the sector.

Minister of Industry

Germanico Salgado has identified as the principal problems and distortions in this sector (1) the country's unhealthy reliance on imported
technologies, raw materials, and intermediate goods, (2) the heavy regional concentration of industrial activities, and (3) former policies of
indiscriminate protectionism that inhibited competition and encouraged
high prices and low quality

(~

Comercio, December 14, 1979).

Given

industry's high degree of dependence on foreign inputs in the form of
technology and capital equipment, its fate over the short term will be
very much tied to the country's capacity to generate foreign exchange
through petroleum sales abroad.

Over the long term, either the export

sector must be diversified in order to support industry's appetite for
imported materials, or else the structure of production in industry will
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have to be transformed in a way consistent with the country's present
and future technological and raw materials capabilities.

Additional

restraints to the growth of domestic industry are the miniscule domestic
market, which has engendered an industrial system geared toward higher
income and foreign buyers (Junta, 1979:8-9), and an inadequate tr~spor
tat ion and communications infrastructure which has failed to keep pace
with the demands of a growing economy.
The current economic development process, characterized by speculation and rapid growth, has been demonstrated to be particularly
vulnerable to inflationary pressures, a phenomenon that has obvious
social as well as economic implications.

The International Bank for

Reconstruction and Development reported that the inflation rate in
Ecuador for the period 1970-1976 averaged 15.2 per cent per year (1979:

l26). The high during the period was 22.7 per cent in 1974 (Herrera,
1979:85). Though a reversal of this trend was apparent during 1978 and
1979, with rates of 11 and 10 per cent respectively being reported, 1980
promises to see a return to levels in excess of those operating prior to

1978. Recent laws increasing the minimum wage and reducing the workweek
are being credited for a new round of price hikes that could result in an
inflation rate of as much as 30 per cent for 1980.

The government, however,

has announced optimistically that it will seek to limit inflation to 20
per cent through the imposition of credit restraints (Latin American Weekly
Report, January ll, 1980:6).

Inflation in Ecuador nevertheless is not

only a function of circumstantial phenomena.

The Rold6s administration

has identified at least five inflation-producing factors that are inherent
in the production structure of the economy:

(1) low productivity in the

agricultural and livestock sector, leading to food supply shortages,
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(2) inadequate marketing systems, (3) limited manufacturing capabilities
for consumer goods, (4) rigidities in the budgetary system, and (5) the
speculative use of payments mechanisms and the uncontrolled expansion
of credit and finance (Gobierno, 1980 I:36-37).
With a foreign debt of close to 4 billion dollars and a growing
dependence on imports, external pressures are destined to complicate
Ecuador's economic problems during the presidency of Jaime Rold6s.
Repayment of old debts will signify an enormous drain on the nation's
resources while the government must be careful of contracting new debts
for necessary development projects.

The National Development Council

(Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo, CONADE) estimates that the country will
require 3,000 million dollars over the next four years to import the goods
and services needed for capital formation and the healthy operation of
the economy.

Additionally, it will need another 1,200 million yearly

for debt service and profit remittances on foreign capital invested in
the country.

The ability of the economy to generate these sums is limited.

Petroleum will constitute an uncertain revenue base at best, since
increasing profits are contingent upon the fate of foreign markets and
the success of domestic exploration efforts.
are becoming increasingly more rigid:

On the other hand, imports

certain goods (raw materials,

capital equipment, food products) must continue to be imported at the same
or increasing levels to avoid causing serious disruptions in the national
economy (Gobierno, 1980 I:22,34).

Increased indebtedness, constraints

on export expansion, and the growing demand for imports, are all factors
that in recent years have seriously curtailed the foreign trade sector,
traditionally the most dynamic of the economy.

Moreover, Ecuador's

dependence on foreign sources rather than on internal consumption for
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capital accumulation places the nation's economy at the mercy of world
market conditions, monetary fluctuations, and changes in technology to
a dangerous extent.

Foreign incursions in the Ecuadorean economy

extend as well to a steadily growing presence of foreign capital in
important sectors of the national economy (Gobierno, 1980 1:34).

On the

other hand, the agricultural origins of a significant portion of the
country's foreign exchange earning capacity prevents an even more
unhealthy dependence on petroleum and lends a modicum of diversity to
the country's export sector.
By the government's own admission, the real or anticipated dislocations of the national economy have an effect on state action that, in
conjunction with an oligarchic-dominated social order and a potential
curtailment of net public revenues, could seriously limit the government's options as an agent of socioeconomic change.

Of particular

concern is the erosion over recent years of tax revenues, which between
1972 and 1979 declined from 14.3 per cent of the GDP to 10 per cent
(Gobierno, 1980 1:35).

Instead of improving internal sources of revenues,

previous regimes in the seventies resorted increasingly to the expedient
of foreign loans in times of need, thereby encumbering for years to come
the nation's primary, albeit temporary, source of income, petroleum.
Pressures on the external sector for national revenues are only intensified by the heavy public sector reliance on customs duties, today
accounting for 50 per cent of all tax revenues (Gobierno, 1980 I:35).
But the weakening of the state is not only a function of a feeble tax
base; rather the relative autbnomy of the state in guiding the transformation process will be further diminished in direct proportion to the
decline in petroleum exports and the preservation of current socioeconomic
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structures.

Furthermore, petroleum wealth has allowed Ecuador the

luxury of a bloated and expensive bureaucracy (estimated at between
150,000 and 200,000 individuals in 1977 ~Herrera, 1979:107, l12_71,the
costs of which are increasingly difficult to bear while a middle sector
of professionals, bureaucrats, and technicians depends for economic
security on the maintenance of a burgeoning administrative budget.

The

growing state enterprise system (numbering 49 firms in 1980) and autonomous agencies, together with a costly, poorly coordinated, and largely
inefficient bureaucratic apparatus, constitute not only a net drain on
scarce state revenues, but also a great waste of resources that could
be more profitably used for critical development projects (Gobierno,
1980 I:38; II:117).
Ill-conceived public poliCies devised and executed by previous
regimes only exacerbate the growing crisis in public administration that
confronts the Rold6s-Hurtado regime.

Nowhere·are the dilemmas facing

the current government more apparent than in the area of subsidies and
price controls.

Though on the one hand government enforced pricing

regulations on fuels and food staples such as wheat, corn, potatoes,
rice, sugar, and milk serve to project a concern for social justice and
to generate political support among the poor, on the other hand, they
do little to encourage initiative for investment or production in the
private sector, nor are they consistent with the government's stated
objective of broad economic development within a capitalist framework.
In the same vein, other public policy orientations have worked to perpetuate dualistic, elitist, and dependent tendencies through decisions on
public expenditures, foreign commerce, and monetary and credit policies
that have clearly favored the cities over the countryside and monied
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minorities over impoverished majorities (Gobierno, 1980 1:39).
Perhaps the greatest challenge to governmental resourcefulness
will come not in the economic realm, but rather in the social arena.
Ecuador's social problems indeed are massive both qualitatively and
quantitatively.

The legacy of a colonial past laden with hierarchical,

paternalistic, and authoritarian traditions weighs heavily on the entire
culture.

As Ecuador approaches the year 2000, repression and exploita-

tion continue to exist in a pervasive way throughout national society.
Petroleum wealth in the seventies did little to bring about justice and
equality in Ecuador; indeed most observers agree that the petroleum
era has left the poor worse off not merely in relative terms, but in
absolute terms as well (Gobierno, 1980 I: passim.; Economia, 1980:5).
Declining food production and inflation, two phenomena that
derive directly from the development process generated by petroleum,
have had an observable impact on the diets and living standards of the
poor.

According to a study reported in El Comercio (November 28, 1979),

the average daily consumption of proteins in Ecuador is thirty-seven
grams, considerably less than the minimum recommended sixty-two.

The

National Institute of Nutrition reported that the sector of the population economically most in need suffers a deficit of 18 per cent in
calories, 19.4 per cent in animal proteins, and 43.6 per cent in calcium
(El Comercio, October 15, 1979; December 28, 1979).

Low nutritional

levels, though a nationwide phenomenon, are especially critical in
urban areas where jobs and salaries have not kept pace with the growing
influx of migrants.
Available evidence would indicate that as more and more wealth
was generated in the seventies, not only was less going into the hands
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of the poor relative to other social groups, but also that as inflation
eroded the purchasing power of the sucre, lower echelon wage earners
were finding it increasingly difficult to satisfy minimum needs.

Between

1970 and 1979, salaries grew at an average rate of 16.9 per cent per
year while prices rose at an average rate of 12.2 per cent.

Net salary

gains over the period, therefore, were on the order of only 4.2 per
cent at the same time that the economy was expanding at an annual rate
of approximately 10 per cent, and productivity at a rate that approached
three times that of net wage increases (Gobierno, 1980 IV:25-26).

At the

same time that wealth was becoming increasingly more concentrated, wages
as a percentage of GDP were declining from 42.1 per cent in 1970 to
33 per cent in 1979, according to a recent study by the Central University
Institute for Economic Research (Economia, 1980:4).

USing 1970 as a

base year, the purchasing power of the sucre had declined 66 per cent by
1979, so that the 1979 minimum wage of 74 dollars monthly had a real
buying power of only 25 dollars.

The 100 per cent minimum wage increase

of 1980 (to 148 dollars) gave the average worker a real wage of only 44
dollars relative to 1970 (Economia, 1980:5).

In 1977, the Central Bank

drew an index of real minimum wages by sectors adjusted for inflation that
revealed that, using 1970 as the base year, income for artisans had an
index of 86.5 while indexes for agricultural workers stood at 97.1 and
82.0 for Sierra and Coast respectively (Banco Central, 1977:154).

The

Central University study cited previously demonstrates that a recommended
2,600 calorie diet for a family of five cost 152 dollars in July, 1980,
4 dollars more than the official minimum wage (Economia, 1980:5), while
minimum family expenses in Quito for rent, food, transportation, schooling, clothing, and recreation were estimated in 1979 to be 220 dollars

20

per month eEl Comercio, October 15, 1979).
The plight of the urban employed is magnified many times over in
the case of Ecuador's approximately 1,300,000 marginals.

Constituting

over 50 per cent of the economically active population, the marginals
essentially are those citizens who are underemployed, individuals who
because they lack secure employment and adequate remuneration, are
physically or psychologically removed from access to health services,
education, housing, social security, and political influence (Gobierno,
1980 I:34).

The problem of marginalization clearly is greatest in the

rural areas and constitutes only one of many complex factors contributing in recent years to a process of rural-urban migration that by 1981
had assumed significant proportions.

The low level of job generation

by the urban modern sector, combined with deficiencies of education and
skills on the part of the migrants, serve to complicate the process of
integration by recent arrivals and to heighten the social tensions in
the urban setting (Gobierno, 1980 IV:3l).

Invasions of municipal and

private lands by new migrants constitute a growing problem in Guayaquil,
and both the port city and the capital find that their resources are
strained to

a~

intolerable level by the multiple difficulties wrought

by the migratory trend.
Evidence of rural marginalization and of the growing gap between
city and countryside are everywhere apparent.

Drinking water is avail-

able to inhabitants of only 16.8 per cent of rural areas while dwellers
of 81 per cent of urban areas are the benefactors of this service.
Rural inhabitants receive medical attention on average only once every
two and one-half years and only 2 per cent of rural heads of families
receive social security benefits.

Of the 153,000 housing units constructed
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by the government in the seventies, 98 per cent were in urban areas,
despite the fact that a majority of the national population is rural
(El Comercio, October 11, 1980).

Eighty-eight per cent of rural

residents lack electricity and 87 per cent have no indoor plumbing
(~

Comercio, December 27, 1979).

The impoverishment of the rural

sector is but one manifestation of a broader phenomenon, the lack of
national integration, that is recognized by CONADE as being a major
deterrent to national development (Gobierno, 1980 I:34).

The dichot-

omy between large, metropolitan economic centers and small provincial
units, between tradition and modernity, is a singlular expression of
the atomization process that characterizes Ecuadorean society.

Perhaps

more invidious than the socioeconomic dimension of the problem is the
cultural one, revealed in the persistent condemnation by dominant
minorities of their indigenous and mestizo heritage, a practice that
not only inhibits the formation of a national value system, but also
fosters the adoption of models and values extraneous to Ecuadorean cultural reality.
Qualities of exploitation, inequality, marginalization, and the
prostitution of national values that characterize the Ecuadorean social
system are perpetuated by an educational system plagued by chronic
scarcity of human and material resources and by antiquated methods and
curricula.

Though recent governments have made important inroads on

infrastructural deficits in education, especially at the elementary
level, the country today still is unable to provide adequate educational
opportUnities for its school-age population.

The deficit is greatest at

the secondary level, where only 46.7 per cent of the high school age
population was enrolled in 1979.

Moreover, desertion rates are high
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at both the elementary and the secondary levels:

nationwide, only 51

per cent of grade-school age children reach the sixth grade, while
at the secondary level the completion rate in 1979 was 48.6 per cent
(Gobierno, 1980:v:40, 58).

Not surprisingly, rural education is

considerably more deficient than that provided in urban areas.
~T

Secona-

education is practically nonexistent in the countryside, while at

the elementary level, 67 per cent of children entering the first grade
do not complete the sixth (Gobierno, 1980 v:40).

Revised figures for

the 1974 census indicate that over 98 per cent of agrarian workers have
less than six years of schooling (CONADE,.1979).

Illiteracy nation-

wide is estimated officially at 26 per cent.

Simplistically viewed, the election of 1979 was essentially a
contest between reform and status quo, between one candidate who promised
to rationalize the management of Ecuador's prosperity and transform
structureS in a way that would allow a greater number of citizens to
share in the new-found affluence, and another candidate who harkened
back to the trickle-dovm developmentalist models of the sixties.
When Rold6s was elected, the mandate was clear:

over one million

voters chose reform over status quo and the new regime was committed
to embark on a search for the mechanisms to implement the social,
economic, and political reform programs that had been laid out in the
lf2l Bases Prograrnaticas."

The administrative structure for reform had

already been provided by the 1979 constitution in the form of the
National Development Council (CONADE), the governmental planning
agency that, under the direction of the vice-president of the country,
would unite all major groups in mapping out and executing strategies
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for national economic and social development.

Shortly after the

election Vice-President Hurtado set about to forge the technical team
that would form the nucleus of CONADE, absorbing in the process the
old National Planning Board (Junta Nacional de Planificaci6n) that
had been in existence since the fifties.

By January, 1980, a 1000-

page draft five-year development plan had been submitted for national
debate and it was that plan, with modifications, that was signed into
law by the president on March 8, 1980. 2
In keeping with the dominant theme of the Rold6s campaign,
the Plan emphasizes three global objectives:

democratic institution-

alization, economic development, and social justice.

The administra-

tion ackno. . 'ledges that its most important task is the creation of
a solid foundation for functional democracy and the peaceful transfer
of political power (I:23, 45-48).

The problem of democracy is viewed

not so much as a question of "bad constitutions" as it is one of
anachronistic structures that inhibit the full participation of Ecuadoreans in the national system.

Expansion of the democratic base, therefore,

implies a concomitant expansion of the national economy, the elimination of social inequality, the stimulation of mass participation, the
integration of indigenous cultures into national life, and the enhancement of the autonomous decision-making capabilities of the nation.
The government is aware, however, that conterminous policies of
economic development and social justice--so critical to the government's perception of its "historic" role--can be a two-edged sword.
Conscious of the potential contradictions between the implied dual
models of accumulation and distribution, the administration seeks to
pursue both objectives Simultaneously and in a way that will ensure
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complementarity rather than mutual exclusion.
Broadly speaking, economic development programs contemplated in
the Plan will be oriented toward the following goals:

intensification

and rationalization of natural resource usage (especially in the area
of energy resources), stimulation of domestic production in agriculture
and industry, and expansion of exports.

Priority attention will be

devoted to the agrarian sector in terms of providing it with economic,
technical, and educational resources in order to improve the supply
of staples for the domestic market, increase exports, and reverse the
flight of resources from the rural sector.

Efforts will also be made

to decentralize the development process in the country and to improve
public administration so as to render it a more effective agent of
national development.
Social objectives in the Plan will aim to ensure "the equitable
participation of all Ecuadoreans in national wealth by providing
greater access to the economic, social, and cultural rewards of the
nation" (I:48).

Though difficult to achieve in the short span of five

years in a country where 50 per cent of the population is marginalized,
the government nevertheless will strive to open the way to social
justice by eliminating underemployment and increasing jobs, expanding
health, housing, and educational services, encouraging mass organization, and restoring an appreciation of native cultures as a first step
in forging a national culture.
According to projections contained in the National Development
Plan, the three main priority objectives of democratic institutionalization, economic development, and social justice will be carried out
in a framework of broad-based structural reform in five key areas:
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taxation, administration, land tenure and agrarian production, education, and the political system (I:23-24).
1)

Taxation:

reforms in the tax system will be executed to

render taxation more equitable, to orient the private sector
toward priority activities in the national economy, and to
garner for the state more revenues for social programs and
public sector investment.
2)

Administration:

administrative reform will seek to infuse

public administration with a more efficient structure,
eliminate waste, and incorporate criteria of talent, merit,
and professionalism in appointments to gdv.ernmental posts.
3)

Land tenure and agrarian production:

agrarian reform, which

will take place through current legislative norms and in
coordination with programs of colonization and integrated
rural development proposed in the Plan, will attempt to
remedy traditional inequities of land distribution and use.
Reform in this area will give access to land by landless
peasants, salaried rural workers, and minifundistas.

It

will further strive to encourage the formation of more
efficient productive units, increase rural productivity, and
ultimately to integrate the peasant into the political,
social, economic, and cultural development process of the
country.
4)

Education:

reform of the educational system is premised on

the notion that public education is a critical medium for
the execution and preservation of the transformations projected in all areas of society and the economy.

In addition,
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it is viewed as the appropriate instrument for forging the
affective and effective commitment of all citizens to the
transformation process.

Educational reform therefore will

be directed toward a major restructuring of the curricular
and methodological foundations of the system, in addition to
expanding basic educational infrastructure.
5)

Political system:

reform in the political arena will seek

to decentralize political power in Ecuador and to mobilize
the populace through grassroots organization and through the
franchise and plebiscite processes.

Ultimately, the goal is

to enhance mass participation not only in the social and
economic life of the country, but also in political and
governmental decision-making.
For the five-year period 1980-1984, the Plan envisions an injection
through public and private sources of 13,935 million dollars into the
economy, which will stimulate annual average GDP increases of 6.5 per
cent and an overall per capita domestic product increment from 1,114
dollars to l,3l2 dollars.
ate 490,000 new

job~

The dynamic growth of the economy will gener-

which will be sufficient to absorb 100 per cent of

the increase in the economically active population (439,000) and will
reduce unemployment by 50,000.

Workers entering the job market during

the period will see their salaries' share of GDP increase from 33 per
cent to 40 per cent.

Efforts to stimulate exports will result in

annual average increases of 4.2 per cent in export value, a considerable
improvement over the 1.5 per cent average for the period 1975-1978,
(I:75-76).

The government is convinced that these goals are realistic

given the present state of the economy and the society and the projected
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future evolution of both over the five-year period of the plan.

The

forecasts indicated take into account such factors as the likely availability of domestic savings and public revenues, the residual scarcity
of certain factors of production such as skilled labor, the perpetuation of certain structural rigidities in

productive capacity, and

the country's limited capabilities for foreign endebtedness.

Certain

assumptions, however, have been made, such as the progressive expansion
of the export sector.

Without increased exports, either certain

projected economic goals will have to be curtailed or else they will be
achieved only with significant injections of foreign capital, a circumstance that would introduce inevitable imbalances in the national
economy (I:76-77).
BeCause the rural sector is a critical component in any national
development scheme, and to overcome the neglect to which it has been
subjected during the petroleum era, agriculture and livestock will
occupy an important place in actions relating to the implementation of
the Plan.

Out of total projected public investments for development of

4,714 million dollars during the term of the Plan, 745 million dollars
(15.8 per cent) are earmarked for the rural sector for programs of
agrarian reform and colonization, technical assistance, rural credit,
agricultural research, and storage facility construction.

In addition,

the rural sector will also benefit from social improvementsand infrastructure projects involving forestation, irrigation, electrification,
housing, sanitation, roadbuilding, and education.

Government efforts

to stimulate agricultural production and productivity, as well as to
improve the social and physical infrastructure in the countryside, will
result in yearly sectoral growth rates of 5.1 per cent over the period.

>=
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Traditional export crops such as cacao, bananas, and coffee, together with
newer items such as palm oil, will receive direct stimulus as part of
the administration's strategy to lessen the dominance of petroleum in
the export sector.

Steps will also be taken to improve the production

of such staples as rice, potatoes, wheat, and corn.

The administra-

tion has already moved to increase the retail price of wheat and milk
as an incentive to further private investment, and it will continue to
study price levels operating for other basic commodities in an effort
to reverse the pattern of agrarian stagnation and the concomitant drain
on foreign exchange reserves.
Social as well as economic objectives are inherent in the administration's programs of land reform, colonization, and rural mass organization.

The Plan projects the distribution of 895,000 hectares of land

to 77,000 peasant families during the five-year period, while another
15,000 families will be resettled on 750,000 hectares through colonization programs (III:5l, 62).

Furthermore, the organization of communes,

communal enterprises, producer and marketing cooperatives, and peasant
federations will be actively encouraged by the government.

This effort,

combined with the improvement of government services to peasants, will
serve to "promote a qualitative transformation of rural society through
which a more just distribution of the benefits generated by the development process will be achieved" (III:23-25).

Though social objectives are

important, it is nevertheless apparent that the agrarian strategy is
predicated on the desperate need for increased production.

And though

the long-term goal of the government in the agricultural sector is selfsufficiency through coordinated planning, it is recognized that over
the short term the country will have to adjust to a situation of less
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than total abundance until the current dislocations can be remedied
through actions that are as much a function of private sector response
as they are of state initiative

(~Comercio,

December 18, 1979).

Another key area for governmental action under the guidelines of
the Plan is energy.

Specifically, the Rold6s administration will work

to increase the availability of renewable energy sources (particularly
hydraulic power) while at the same time it strives to reduce dependence
on thermal sources, rationalize the consumption and price structure of
petroleum derivatives, strengthen CEPE financially and orient its activities toward exporations for new oil deposits, and upgrade the National
Energy Institute to enable it to intensify its search for practical
means to utilize non-conventional energy sources (I:50-51; VI:13-20,
57-61).

Over the five-year period, the government will spend 1,457

million dollars (30.9 per cent of the total planned public investment
for development) in projects relating to energy, with the greatest
expenditures coming in hydroelectricity and oil and natural gas exploration and production.
The heavy dependence of Ecuador's economy on oil both as an
energy source and as a generator of foreign exhange determines that the
performance of the petroleum industry and the nature and implementation
of governmental poliCies relating thereto will be critical factors in
the success or failure of the National Development Plan.

Increasing

demand and diminishing reserves will mean over the period that Ecuador's
exportable surplus of petroleum will experience a 7.5 per cent decline.
On the other hand, anticipated growth of the country's refining capacity
will permit an increase of derivative exports that, together with expected
world price increases, will result in a net petroleum export value
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increase of 7.7 per cent.

The total value of petroleum exports (crude

and refined), based on a production rate of 225,000 barrels per day,
will be 9,030 million dollars, an amount equivalent to 46.5 per cent
of the total value of exports for the period (1:154; V1:22-23).

Explor-

ation for new reserves, a key factor in Ecuador's oil program, are viewed
with some optimism, all the moreso since the discovery in October,
1980, of a new Oriente deposit containing an estimated 1,500 barrels,
an amount that will boost Ecuador's known reserves by 136 per cent

(~

Comercio, October 8, 1980).
The health of Ecuador's export sector has been and will continue to
be a principal determinant of the dynamism of the national economy.
Without the foreign exchange and the secondary growth occasioned by an
active export sector, ECUador's economy would surely stagnate.

Therefore,

the government's strategy during the period of the Plan will be to
fortify the export sector through policies of expansion and diversification.

Though it is acknowledged that petroleum will continue to domin-

ate exports throughout the period, its relative position compared to
other items will decline from 50 per cent of value in 1980 to 40.5 per
cent in 1984.

The slack left by the decline of petroleum values will be

taken up by increasing exports of agricultural goods and manufactures
(1:85-87, 89).

Government sponsored programs to increase production

in bananas, cacao, and coffee will result in exports of raw and processed goods totaling nearly 2,216 million dollars over the period, representing a percentage share increase from 27.9 in~'1980 to 28.4 in 1984.
A combination of government incentives and improving market conditions
will, it is estimated, boost cacao exports by 18.7 per cent per year
and those of coffee by 20 per cent.
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The impetus experienced by the manufacturing sector in the seventies
is expected to continue at least through the mid-eighties, with a projected average growth rate of 9.0 per cent.

New market opportunities,

especially through the Andean Pact, will spur the growth of manufactured
exports at a rate of 31.3 per cent per year for total earnings of
2,864 million dollars and a total export share jump from 11.8 per cent
in 1980 to 18.9 per cent by 1984.

Major advances will be observed

particularly in marine products, wood manufactures, electrical appliances,
and toward the end of the period, metal products and automobiles.
At the same time that the administration will work to increase
exports, it will also take steps through a variety of measures to
diminish the country's dependence on imports.

Current strategies call

for tariff revisions to curtail luxury imports and the implementation
of an energetic import substitution program (I:88, 90-91, 163).

Major

substitution efforts, many of which will be carried out through direct
government investment, will concentrate on steel, cement, nitrogen
fertilizers, paper products, automobiles, agroindustry (vegetable oils,
yuca and corn flour, tomato sauces and juices), pharmaceuticals, and
insecticides.

Production goals in these areas alone will save the

country an estimated 335 million dollars in foreign exchange.

Additional

savings will derive from planned increases in domestic oil refining
capacity, thereby eliminating the need for costly imports of petroleum
products.

According to current projections, imports of all goods and

services will diminish from 27.5 per cent of the GDP in 1979/80, to
24.2 per cent in 1984.
Increasing investment and production in all sectors will permit
a noticeable improvement in national employment (I:93; IV:34-37).

The
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employed population will grow from 2,555,000 in 1979 to 3,045,000 in
1984.

Since employment will expand at a greater rate than the working

population (3.6 per cent per year, versus 3.1 per cent), by 1984, net
unemployment will register significant declines and a good portion of
the marginalized popUlation will have been provided with steady employment.

Though agricultural and livestock activities will continue to

employ a majority of working age citizens, the largest employment
increases will be experienced in energy, construction, and mining, with
employment growth rates in excess of 6.0 per cent, followed by manufacuring and services, each with expansion rates of over 4.0 per cent.

The

growth of jobs will be matched by increasing wages over the period,
which, according to the Plan, will reach 40 per cent of the GDP.

Infla-

tionary pressures will be lessened by measurable increases in productivity,
production, and consumption, with the latter expected to grow at a per
capita rate of 3.6 per cent per year (1:84).
As a necessary adjunct to the economic development process, a
considerable portion of government investment (14.1 per cent) over the
five-year period will be earmarked for rural and urban infrastructure
in the areas of transportation and communications.

One of the principal

objectives of roadbuilding, telephone, and electrification projects
will be to effect a greater integration of the nation by tying into
major networks those areas of the country that at present remain
isolated.

Completion of major north-south highway networks in the

coastal, highland, and Oriente regions are contemplated, together with
numerous feeder roads connecting trunk lines in the three zones.
Between 1980 and 1984, nearly one billion dollars will be spent on the
construction of approximately 5,600 kilometers of roads (VI:I04-l05).

----

--
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In addition, investment programs totaling another billion dollars in
electrifiaation, irrigation, and telecommunications will affect nearly
every province in the country.

Coastal agriculture, important for its

export potential, will benefit from irrigation projects covering 138,000
hectares, while the country's generating capacity for electricity will
be considerably improved through the Paute and Agoyan hydroelectric
projects in the central and southern highland regions.

Furthermore,

telephone service by 1984 will have been extended to all twenty provinces
and important cities will have benefitted from greatly expanded and
improved facilities (1:111, 113-118).
The government's strategies for development in the social realm
are guided by two considerations:

(1) that dynamic growth of the

capitalistic system, complemented by governmental

~egulation

and direct

intervention in key areas, will result in intermediate- and long-term
across-the-board improvements in living standards for all social groups,
and (2) that the government has an immediate responsibility to the
poor for providing services and opportunities that will help over the
short term to prepare marginals to participate more effectively in the
emerging new order and to ameliorate conditions of poverty created by
the imbalanced and disarticulated models of development of previous years.
Accordingly, social programs in the Plan will have a very high priority
relative to other areas of governmental action.

In the breaKdown of

government investment programs for social and economic development,
projects related to "social improvement" (encompassing such areas as
drinking water, sanitation, health, education and literacy, popular
promotion and social welfare, and housing) are slated to receive

32.9 per cent of the total planned expenditures of 4,714 million dollars.
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In addition, another 15.8 per· cent is assigned to

II

rural development"

(including storage facilities, rural roads, electrification, health,
and education), thus raising the total expenditure for projects related
to social programs to 2,245 million dollars, or nearly half of total
public investment in all categories during the five-year period (I:I06107).

Specific projects in the field of social services include the

following:

the construction of 3,700 kilometers of rural roads, the

creation of 37 health centers and 117 subcenters in rural areas, the
establishment of 25 new potable water systems, the construction and
equipping of 18 full-service hospitals, the provision of 143,400 urban
and rural "housing solutions," and the implementation of a literacy
program affecting 760,000 persons (I:113-118).

Major emphasis will be

given to education, especially in the areas of elementary education and
vocational training.

Over the five-year period, the government plans

to increase the number of classrooms by 12,465 at.' the elementary level
and 3,750 at the secondary level.

In addition, twenty-three new technical-

vocational schools will be created (V:19-20, 40, 50, 62-63).
A major component of the administration's social program is a
concept called popular promotion, which is, in effect, a program of mass
mobilization for the articulation of needs and the fulfillment of those
needs through direct social, political, and economic involvement in the
national system.

According to the modus operandi adopted by the govern-

ment, popular promotion, in conjunction with other complementary social
and economic measures contained in the Plan, will permit the operation
of mechanisms conducive to the creation of an authentically democratic
society (Iv:63).

Popular promotion projects, involving an investment

of nearly 80 million dollars, will target such groups as peasants, urban
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poor, women, and youth, and will emphasize grass-roots organization in
the form of communes, cooperatives, syndicates, and neighborhood associations.

In addition, collateral programs will be initiated in such areas

as job training, consumer protection, recreation, low-cost housing, and
self-help techniques (IV:87).
Financing the National Development Plan over the next five years
will represent a considerable challenge, especially given the restraints-both those dictated by fiscal prudence and those imposed by the current
and future status of the economy--under which the Plan will be executed.
The administration estimates that in order to achieve average GDP growth
rates of 6.5 per cent, total investment will have to increase at an
annual rate of 6.8 per cent (I:83-84, 97, l25).

The need to curtail

foreign borrowings dictates that 85 per cent of the total planned
investment of 13,935 million dollars be generated internally; the remaining 15 per cent (roughly 2,250 million dollars) will proceed from foreign
loans and direct foreign investment.

Though the government will be

responsible for debt service payments of 2,800 million dollars during
the term of the Plan, only 4 per cent of this amount will be for debts
incurred during the Rold6s administration.

Total net utilization of

new loans during the period will be 1,983 million dollars.

Government

plans call for the private sector, which is not legally bound to adhere
to the Plan, to finance 61.3 per cent of the total projected investment.

The public sector, therefore, will be called upon to provide funding
totaling over 5,000 million dollars to carry out the basic projects in
transportation, communications, utilities, and social services that are
critical to the success of the Plan.

The government's forecast of a

9,8 per cent yearly increase in public investment is predicated on
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projected revenue increases accruing from tax reform and export expansion.
Aware of the extreme resource limitations under which it must operate,
the government has stated that public sector investment must adhere to
strict criteria of rationality and efficiency.
must never lose sight of the social

~bjectives

While the government
of the Plan, by the same

token it must manage its resources in a manner that will ensure the
balanced and unencumbered growth of the economy on which the success of
the three-pronged strategy (democracy, economic development, and social
justice) of the Plan ultimately depends.
Political Reality and Democratic Institutionalization
President Rold6s' plans for social and economic reform are intended
to complement and in turn be complemented by actions designed to fortify
the democratic base of the country.

The political viability of the regime--

its flexibility for action and its chances of survival--will be very
much circumscribed by the new juridical order created in anticipation
of the return to civilian rule.

Regulation of the institutional life

of the new democracy is invested principally in the 1977 Law of Parties
and the Constitution of 1979, both of which instruments were drafted
after careful deliberation by individuals (such as Hurtado and Rold6s,
who themselves served on the pre-election special lesislative commissions) who were intimately familiar with the historical forces that
shaped the nation's past leading to the current state of affairs in
Ecuador's political life. 3

Their appraisal of the historical origins

of the country's maladies, as well as the solutions devised to remedy
them, were based on empirical evidence and pretended, therefore, to be
bluntly realistic.

Chronic instability; dictatorship; legislative

inaction; fragmentation of parties; crises of consensus, legitimacy, and
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continuity; political non-participation by vast numbers of citizens;
personalism and demagoguery; and the coopting of political authority
by powerful minorities, are some of the shortcomings that were diagnosed
as having led in the past to a shortcircuiting of the democratic process.
A deficient party structure--a proliferation of parties and their
personal and ephemeral character--was particularly singled out as one
of the most flagrant causes of instability and dictatorship.

Osvaldo

Hurtado, president of the Third Special Commission that drew up the
Law of Parties, condemned those parties that in the past reflected neither
the reality nor the needs of the nation, but rather dominated the system
through the personality of the charismatic leader.

Tbis situation, accord-

ing to Hurtado, explains why in Ecuadorean politics "ideological and
programmatic debate has always been absent, replaced instead by vacuous
rhetoric, personal conflict, and the utilitarianism of de facto groupings"
(~Comercio,

June 24, 1977).

The Tbird Commission therefore worked to

eliminate superfluous and dysfunctional groupings and to stimulate the
emergence of "genuine" parties that would spring from national reality and
respond to vital SOCial, economic, and ideological forces as they exist
and evolve over time.

To facilitate the realization of this ideal, the

new Law of Parties, while guaranteeing the right of all groups to organize
formal parties and of citizens (except for the clergy and armed forces
personnel in active service) to join them, nevertheless imposes a series
of restrictions and regulations relating to party name, membership,
organization, and program and philosophy_

To qualify for legal recogni-

tion, parties must provide a membership list comprising at least 0.5
per cent of the nation's registered voters (10,000 members out of two
million voters), and proof of the "national" scope of the party, entailing

the establishment of viable party organizations in at least half of the
country's twenty provinces.

Furthermore, parties must constantly

demonstrate their right to exist as such by participating regularly in
elections and by giving evidence of voter strength equivalent to 5 per
cent (100,000 votes out of two million) of all votes cast in congressional,
provincial, or municipal elections.
In a major innovation, the law provides for state subsidization
of legal parties, the justification for which being that under the new
order, parties are to be viewed as permanent centers for political
mobilization and education, as welLas for the training of new political
leadership; as such, they deserve direct state support.

Ultimately, the

goal is to render the political profession honorable in Ecuador (El
Comercio, June 24, 1977).
to this goal.

The Rold6s-Hurtado government subscribes fully

The self-imposed democratic mission of the new regime is

really a task of institutionalization of a party system wherein politics will be elevated to the realm of doctrine, ideology, and program.
A politicized and enlightened electorate will necessarily render the
government more responsive and responsible, and will reduce the possibility
that political action will revert to the status of a private club for
demagogues and oligarchic elites motivated only by personal or sectoral
gain.
The new constitution that went into effect on August 10, 1979,
contains several reforms that were designed by its drafters to eradicate
major juridical deficiencies and at the same time to provide the state
with the realistic instruments needed to create a functional democracy
within a framework of social justice.

The new charter, for example, not

only recognizes the social function of property, but also establishes
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four sectors of the economy (in contrast to the three sectors normally
prescribed in Latin American constitutions):

(1) the public sector,

comprising state and "strategic" enterprises, non-renewable natural
resources, and potable water; (2) the mixed sector, composed of those
areas characterized by combined private- and public-sector investment;

(3) the communitarian sector, made up of cooperatives, communes, and in
general all properties held in common by individuals or groups; and (4)
the private sector.

The constitution also grants the state the authority,

"para fines de orden social,11 to nationalize or expropriate property
and to intervene in activities of other sectors when deemed necessary
for the common good.

Thus, the central government is given consider-

able power to dispose of and to allocate resources for the benefit of
the nation, while collective forms of property ownership are for the
first time given legal protection in the nation's political charter.
Common wisdom in Ecuador holds that, in the juridical realm,
the principal causes of the failure of a working democracy are (1) the
ineffectiveness of the legislative branch in discharging its responsibilities as the chief law-making body of the nation, and (2) the maldistribution of power and authority among the legislative and executive
branches of government.

In the past, the legislature was noted for its

inability to accomplish in an efficient and dignified way anything of
a positive nature, often being reduced at best to a national forum for
partisan harangues, and at worst to an arena for venting personal
animosities between rival petty politicians, situations that on occasion
have led to brawls and even gunfire on the floor of congress.

4 A micro-

cosm of a fragmented, atomistic society, the national congress was not- ,
only incompetent in its own realm, but also tended to obstruct effective
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action by the executive because of an improper alignment of attributes
between the two major branches of government.
The Law of Parties, it was reasoned, would ameliorate some of
these deficiencies by elevating politics from the personal to the
ideological plane and by imbuing in the parties a national rather than
a local or regional perspective.

The role of the new constitution, on

the other hand, would be to complement other legal instruments by building into the governing system certain important structural restraints
on the freedom of action of the legislature and by reducing areas of
overlapping responsibility between the executive and legislative branches
of government.

According to the 1979 charter, the legislative function

resides in a unicameral parliament, an innovation designed to streamline
the legislative process by eliminating the cumbersome bicameral system
introduced in 1835.

The national congress is composed of fifty-seven

deputies apportioned among the provinces according to population,
together with twelve deputies elected nationally, the latter incorporated
in substitution of the IIfunctional" senators of previous constitutions
dating to the corporatist experiments of the 1920s.

All legislators

serve for five-year terms (coincident with presidential and vice-presidential terms of office) and cannot be reelected until after one complete
intervening term.

Legislative sessions are limited to sixty days per

year beginning every August 10.

Four legislative commissions comprised

of five members each and presided over by the president of the congress
are to assume legislative functions during periods of congressional
recess. In addition to its all-important advise and consent powers over
the governmental purse-strings, the national congress also enjoys
unilateral control over the appointment of supreme court justices.
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In contrast to the legislative body, the executive branch is
granted considerable powers in all important areas of national life, in
many cases only with limited checks by other branches.

In declaring

a state of siege, the president is required only to "notify" congress
or, in its stead, the tribunal of constitutional guarantees (though
the latter entities are empowered to revoke emergency powers if they
judge that the circumstances warrant such a move).

Nor is the president

required to consult congress in making cabinet appointments.

The

constitution further prescribes two specific instruments that enable
the president to skirt congressional recalcitrance and the debilitating stalemate that could result therefrom.

The first instrument is

the traditional veto,for which the constitution does not ascribe
override authority to the congress, stipulating instead that vetoed
bills may be reconsidered by congress one year from the date of the
veto.

(Presumably the president retains the option of vetoing bills

resubmitted in this fashion, though the constitution is not clear on
this point.)

The second instrument is the plebiscite (Article 78),

through which the president has the authority to bypass congress to
secure passage of presidential measures previously deprived of
sional approval.
modified form:

congres~:

The same privilege is granted congress, though in a
prior presidential approval is required for congres-

sional-sponsored referenda on measures passed by congress but vetoed
by the president (Article 69).
Rold6s has made a strong commitment to the new democratic order
spelled out in the Law of Parties and the Constitution of 1979.

This

commitment applies not only to upholding the letter of the new laws,
but also to furthering the spirit of those laws by strengthening the
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democratic infrastructure of the nation.

The Development Plan maps a

two-front strategy in attacking the problem of democracy.

On the one

hand, the government will adopt measures of a political and legal nature
to expand the franchise and to ensure compliance with legislation
governing political activities; on the other hand, it will seek to
change the structure of power through mass mobilization and grassroots
organization (1:70-71).

Significant inroads toward the expansion of

participation have already been made with the registration of 378,000
illiterates for the provincial and municipal elections scheduled for
December, 1980 (El Comercio, October 16, 1980).

Whatever the final out-

come of the administration's mobilization programs over the next four
years, there can be no doubt that Rold6s has already accomplished more
than any previous president in giving the masses a stake in government
and, at the same time, creating a powerful political force whose presence
will be of decisive importance in national politics for years to come.

III

Analysis and Conclusions
The ultimate test of the Rold6s administration will be the extent
to which the government's programmatic strategies can be translated into
meaningful economic development, social justice, and stable government
based upon popular participation.

The liklihood of success in accomplish-

ing these goals will be dictated not only by the nation's resource
potential nor the resolve of the country's rulers; rather to a significant
degree it will also be very much a function of historical tradition and
the specific national and international milieux in which the development
process unfolds.
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Basically, the administration's economic program revolves around
two strategies:

the expansion of agriculture for domestic consumption

and a reduction of external dependence.

Any broad program for the rural

sector will inevitably face such serious obstacles as the still deeply
entrenched latifundista system which condemns vast acreages to very low
productivity; land exhaustion in large portions of the Sierra, a legacy.;
of centuries of intensive cultivation; highland minifundismo (two-thirds
of Ecuador's basic food items are produced on plots of less than five
hectares); and the absence of a coordinated program of state financial
and technical assistance (~ Comercio, December 6, 1979).5

The develop-

ment of domestic agriculture will take place to a large extent within the
framework of agrarian reform.

In this area, the regime must resolve

the possible contradictions between the demands of social justice on
the one hand, and expanded production within a capitalistic mode on the
other.

In reality, capitalistic agriculture will require a level of

investment and efficiency that might be beyond the available resources
of the state since the infrastructural and technical requirements of
such a

progr~-roads,

irrigation and flood control, marketing facilities,

credit, and technical assistance--will require enormous capital outlays.
Moreover, a large portion of government expenditures will necessarily be
destined for services with a low immediate return on investment (schools,
health facilities, housing); yet these programs constitute an indispensable adjunct to the government's strategy of integrated rural development designed to improve the quality of life of the rural inhabitant at
every level.

Quite apart from the fiscal burdens implicit in the

rural program, emphasis on capitalist agriculture could lead to serious
dislocations of a social nature in the countryside.

In effect, given
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the .predictable opposition to land redistribution from traditional landowners, the need for rational units of production, and the tendency
toward more sophisticated methods of farming involving advanced technology,
one of the government's greatest challenges will be to rationalize
agriculture without turning the peasantry into a lOW-paid rural proletariat.

Nevertheless, it is clear that state participation in rural reform

will be guided initially by economic rather than social criteria; immediate
measures aimed at social reform in the countryside would lead to further
production and marketing bottlenecks that would have serious economic
consequences and ultimately would only enhance the political vulnerability
of the regime.
The government's plan for lessening dependency entails a variety
of programs, including diversification of exports, curtailment of overseas borrowings, and import substitution industrialization and the stimulation of the domestic market.

In the area of export diversification,

Hurtado has made the point that Ecuador's economy is and always be fundamentally agricultural-based, a view that is reflected in the Plan's
emphasis on broadening the country's export base through incentives to
tropical agriculture.

Additional possibilities for export include fish

and fish products, forest products, and manufactured goods covered by
the Andean Pact scheme.

The greater financial demands that these programs

signify (for example, in the form of government loans and tariff reductions) will place added burdens on the national treasury; moreover,
increased government spending could lead to further inflationary pressures, thus frustrating the social reform programs of the administration.
And regardless of the domestic implications of this strategy, its
success will be dependent on locating new markets which themselves are

-

\
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a function of world trade conditions over which the Ecuadorean government
has little control.
Ecuador's deteriorating balance of payments situation over recent
years has induced the government to take a radical stance on the question
of further borrowings abroad.

The country today has a foreign debt of

close to 4, billion dollars, yet it still does not possess sufficient
capital to meet all its development needs.

For the government to achieve

its goal of curtailment of foreign borrowing, it can either do without
this source of capital (or substantially lesser amounts of it), or it
can print new money, the result being either a considerable reduction
of critical public works projects (by far the principal target of
foreign loans) or rampant inflation and

destab~lization

of the sucre.

A third alternative, which is the one opted for by the government, is to
stimulate the internal generation of capital, which would then be tapped
by the government through taxation or as direct income.

To raise in this

way, however, sufficient revenues to finance social investment, service
the foreign debt, and cover mounting administrative costs, will signify
that the resource base of the state will necessarily be dependent on
economic (and even non-economic) factors that lie largely outside the
domain of direct governmental authority.

In a speech to the nation on

October 15, 1980, Vice-President Hurtado lamented that fifteen government
reform programs were seriously behind schedule due to financial difficulties
stemming from a decline in projected petroleum revenues and the

appro~

priation by congress of funds for programs that were not originally
contemplated in the National Development Plan (El Comercio, October 16,
1980).
The other side of the foreign trade question has to do with

manufactured imports.
two ways:

The government hopes to attack this problem in

by restricting luxury imports (a measure that not only would

reduce dependency but also would work to conserve valuable foreign
exchange) and by fomenting import substitution industrialization.

The

administration has recognized that the latter can most advantageously
be accomplished in the areas of food processing, construction materials,
and pharmaceuticals.

Expanded industrial production in the near future,

however, will necessarily be contingent upon the elimination of infrastructural bottlenecks, a continuing favorable investment climate for
private capital, a substantial growth of the domestic market, and the
ultimate viability of procedures worked out in the Andean Pact for full
regional integration.

Moreover, the industrialization process, especially

in heavy industry, will continue to depend heavily on foreign capital
and technology; and notwithstanding Andean Pact restrictions on the
proportionate shares of foreign and domestic capital in regional
industries, international conditions will nonetheless continue to
weigh heavily on the Ecuadorean development process.

Additionally, the

lQQB-uermeconomic effects of recent across-the-board wage hikes and the
reduction of the workweek from forty-four to forty hours are still a
matter of speculation.

What is known at the present time is that the

new salary structure will require an additional expenditure by employers
of 30,000 million sucres per year and that the effect of this will be
to double the country's money supply.

The forecast inflation rate in

1980 due to salary rises alone is 20 per cent, with another 10 per cent
expected by virtue of other factors, such as declining productivity and
increasing production costs.

Most analysts agree that the likely results

of both legislative measures will be increasing unemployment and a
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further concentration of capital in the major industries as small manufacturers and artisans are forced out of business by intolerably high
costs of production.
Governmental plans for social reform are broadly oriented toward
the creation of a more equitable society for all Ecuadoreans.

Essentially,

this means narrowing the gap between rich and poor, giving the underprivileged a stake in the future, and improving the quality of life of
citizens who, because of the traditional rigidities inherent in the
Ecuadorean social system, find themselves heirs to a vicious circle of
poverty.

The administration will approach these goals from three

directions:

re~istriQuting

(1)

income through such programs as land

and tax reform, (2) expanding services, primarily housing, health, and
education, and (3) encouraging mass organization in order to increase
participation.

Though the theoretical foundation of the government's

social program is sound, it is nevertheless one that can be achieved
only at considerable cost, both material and political.

Despite the

fact that part of the costs of social reform will be pushed off on
the rich, significant hardships on the beleaguered national budget will
be unavoidable in light of the magnitude of the task, the many conflicting
demands being made on finite resources, and the uncertain state of the
national economy.

Moreover, additional strains can be expected as a

result of the economically unproductive nature over the short term
of the social infrastructure investments contemplated.

Ultimately,

however, the political costs of social reform might well be of greater
consequence than the material ones.

The groups that stand to lose most,

namely landowners and traditional bourgeois sectors, will be reluctant
to relinquish those gains which they consider to be their birthright.
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To embark on programs depriving these groups of social, economic, and
political benefits to a degree in excess of what they consider tljust"
could force them into a type of opposition not entirely foreseen in
the democratic reforms projected by the administration.

In the past,

the oligarchy has not been disinclined to resort to pressures of an
economic nature in order to defend its interests and to impose conformity on stubborn governments, nor has it been reluctant to appeal
to the military as a last resort to eliminate threats to the status
quo.

On the other hand, the government is equally vulnerable politically

from a reaction by popular groups who have been encouraged to believe
that they

~

the government and who will be watching closely for

positive results from the reforms promised by Rold6s.

While the pres-

ident has prudently warned against expectations of miracles overnight,
any evidence of a betrayal of the popular classes by the administration
could suddenly convert this important ally into a formidable adversary.
At its most fundamental level, however, the problem of social
reform in Ecuador is a complex matter involving psychological and
cultural change as well as basic structural change.

It is not enough

to transfer ownership of the means of production or the social location
of political power to the masses (though admittedly these are not precisely
the goals of the present administration); rather, deeply held values
and prejudices also must change.

Inequality and injustice in Ecuador-

ean society are maintained by a universally accepted value system
that ascribes a social "place" to all individuals according to family
name, job, education, race, and wealth.

Pervading the entire society--

urban and rural, institution and family, government and business--the
patron-client system teaches that, for example, the landowner is on top

and the Indian on the bottom because it is simply in the "naturaltl order
of things for

O~Tners

be subordinate.

of land to be dominant and workers of the

lCL~d

to

Because the administration cannot basically alter the

social relations of production (whether or not it wants to), whatever
gains accrue to the Indian, the factory worker, the stevedore, and the
domestic servant must be granted paternalistically and will not likely
result in the dignity, self-respect, and political assertiveness essential
to an egalitarian society.

Moreover, there remains the determination

of the powerful oligarchy not to concede either its economic or its
psychological hegemony.

Thus, the administration's social program

suggests an interesting diiemma, namely, the extent to which egalitarianoriented social reforms can succeed in a society that is at bottom
unequal.

Meanwhile, Rold6s will have disseminated the symbols of

basic reform with the result of raising expectations and consciousness.
Effective democratic government is not only a function of leadership, consensus, and economic wellbeing; it is also very much conditioned by the presence of an effective relationship among its constituent
branches.

The irony of the Rold6s government is that after coming to

power with the votes of over one million Ecuadoreans, when it took
office it found that it did not enjoy the support even of its own party,
the CFP, whose candidates had 1J/on a numerical majority in congress.
As a matter of fact, differences of a personal and ideological nature

had begun to surface between party boss Assad Bucaram and his
nephew even before the April election.

prot~g~

Disagreements over campaign

strategy and the presence on the ticket of Christian Democrat and longtime Bucaram critic Hurtado further exacerbated the conflict.

6 After the

election, the refusal by Rold6s to defer to his uncle's wishes in the
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development of a plan of government, combined with his selection of
a multi-partisan cabinet, were symptomatic of the ever-escalating conflict between the two leaders.

Bucaram subsequently moved to seal a

political pact in the legislature with the Conservatives and Liberals
(traditional enemies of CFP) in order to guarantee a clear voting
majority under his direction; at the same time, in the face of what was
interpreted to be Rold6s' betrayal of the party that had elevated him
to power, Bucaram served notice on the president that the CFP-ConservativeLiberal coalition would operate with complete independence in the congress.
Thus, from the earliest days of the new regime, the scenario for
political action has been one of continual conflict between the legislative and executive branches of government in what appeared to be a
revisitation upon the country of the type of democratic crisis that
plagued Ecuador throughout her republican existence and the prevention
of which had been the expressed object of the careful planning that
characterized the transition from military to civilian rule after 1976.
Bucaram, elected to the presidency of the parliament, skillfully used
his power base to infiltrate legislative committees and the legal system
with anti-government Cefepistas and to mobilize a coalition majority in
congress to obstruct executive action.

Not only did he work to block

the passage of executive bills on such critical matters as the budget and
CONADE; he also pushed through congress legislative measures (retirement
after twenty-five years for women, across-the-board wage hikes, reduction
of the workweek to forty hours, the creation of new universities and
vocational schools) that were obviously inconsistent with publicized
government planning objectives and seemed to be designed more for
political impact than for true social reform or economic development.
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broken and that the December coalition, achieved only at considerable
political sacrifice by Rold6s, was not fully serving the purposes for
which it had been formed.

Bucaram, though weakened, nevertheless

retained the loyalty of a sufficient portion of congress to .continue
his strategy of harassment of the government.

This second phase of

the confrontation culminated in April, 1980, when the CFP spearheaded
in congress a move to impeach Minister of Government Carlos Feraud for
alleged violations of human rights.

Rold6s retaliated by calling a

special session of congress to consider a constitutional amendment that
would empower the president to dissolve congress once during the
presidential term of office and to hold new parliamentary elections
within a specified period of time.

He threatened to convoke a plebiscite

on the issue should the congress fail to approve the amendment.

He backed

down (on May 19) only when congressional leaders gave the president
assurances of a stable coalition in congress which, in addition to
permitting a productive relationship between the two branches, would also
guarantee in the next session the election to the presidency of the
parliament of a man more favorably inclined toward the government.
Since

¥~y,

the new coalition--composed of Conservatives and Velas-

quistas, in addition to ID, Democracia Popular, and the pro-Rold6s faction
of the CFP--has successfully passed two tests.

The first came in May

with the censure vote on the Feraud case whereby the minister was
cleared of charges by a vote of 33-27 (Latin American Weekly Report,
}~y

30, 1980:5).

The second test came in August when ID deputy Raul

Baca Carbo was narrowly elected (by a vote of 34-33) to a one-year term
as president of the House of Representatives.

Though the conflict

appears to have abated, legislative effectiveness remains deficient.

53

The sixty-day 1980 regular legislative session did not pass a single
piece of important legislation; rather it devoted its energies almost
entirely to censure proceedings against governmental ministers (Correspondence, Gonzalo Ortiz Crespo-Nick Mills, October 24, 1980).
The impassioned and debilitating antagonisms that have characterized relations between the legislative and executive branches of government since August, 1979, are symptomatic of the basic weakness of Ecuador's
fledgling democratic system and have called into serious question the
effectiveness of the juridical reforms that had earlier been implemented
preCisely to eliminate the kinds of stresses that the country witnessed
during the first twelve.months of the ·ne...l regime.
far from over.

Rold~s'

problems are

Not only will he have to tread very softly in order to

preserve his tenuous coalition, but he will also have to be alert to
the potential consequences of expected opposition from those entrenched
interest groups most seriously affected by the administration's reform
programs.

It is precisely these groups whose cause would perhaps best

be served by a continuation of divisions in the government party and
by an intensification of differences between the legislative and executive branches.

With more courage perhaps than true political sense, Rold6s has
taken a strong stand on the issues of economic, social, and democratic
reform as the defining and legitimizing features of his administration.
Even under the best of Circumstances, the scope of a commitment of this
type would greatly limit the government's flexibility for political
action; but given the historical reality of Ecuador, combined with
the vexatious political and economic circumstances in which the country

finds itself at present, the viable options available to President Rold6s
between now and 1984 are practically non-existent.

Though he has youth,

intelligence, sincerity, popular support, and a potentially sound
economy in his favor, these qualities and conditions alone are normally
not considered sufficient to guarantee political success in a developing country characterized by multiple dislocations, limited resources,
inequities, contradictory demands, and imbalances of every sort.

Given

the governing strategy adopted by the regime, Rold6s will stand or
fall according to the extent to which he can provide credible leadership
toward the achievement of the government's basic goals.

Any major

departure from the established plan of government, or a failure to
control the injurious consequences of the implementation of the plan,
could shatter the administration's fragile cross-sectoral political base.
The result would be a crisis of legitimacy and a fatal destabilization
of the regime.

In the event that this happens, the military, the

country's ultimate arbiter in its perennial political disputes, will
have been vindicated in its traditional view that civilians are incapable
of self-government.

Rold6s' democratic reformist plans will be shelved,

and the armed forces will be called upon once more to save Ecuador for
democracy.
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NOTES
1.

In the last decade a group of Ecuadorean social scientists has under-

taken a thorough revision of the nation's history and analysis of
the present.

The innovative work of Osva1do Hurtado (1977) is

indicative of the energy and sensitivity of those now engaged.
Alejandro Moreano (1976), in his challenging essay "Capita1ismo y
1ucha de c1ases en 1a primera mitad del sig10 XX,tl and
(1976) in

'~acia

interpretations.

Ren~ B~ez

un subdesarro110 moderno" provide dependentista
An attempt at synthesizing a class analysis

with dependency theory has been made by
Also see Patricio Moncayo (1979),
Manuel Chiriboga (1978; 1980).

Andr~s

C~sar

Verduga (1977).

Guerrero (1975), and

An important contribution toward a

strict Marxist interpretation is that of Agustin Cueva (1976), an
Ecuadorean now resident in Mexico.

For an interesting summary of

the recent literature on Ecuador and on some of the issues confronted
by the country see Gerhard Drekonja (1980).
2.

The following discussion of Ecuador's National Development Plan,
unless otherwise indicated, is based on the government's six-volume
Plan Naciona1 de Desarrollo, 1980-1984.

Citations in the text will

be identified by volume and page number.
3.

For an account of the workings of the pre-election legislative
commissions by one of the protagonists, see Hurtado (1980:

Epilogue).

4. The most recent incident was on September 30, 1980, when ex-President
Otto Arosemena, national deputy for the Institutionalist Democratic
Coalition (crn), shot his colleague, Conservative Pablo D!valos
Dillon, on the floor of congress following a heated exchange over
the question of the impeachment of a cabinet minister.

5. The magnitude of the problem of minifundismo in statistical terms
can be stated as follows:

60 per cent of the economically active

rural population is working on holdings of less than five hectares.
These minifundia constitute 74 per cent of rural properties and
occupy barely 11 per cent of Ecuador's cultivated land surface
(El Comercio, December 27, 1979).

6.

Also see Ortiz (1979).

For a view of Hurtado's opinion of Bucaram and the CFP, see
Hurtado (1977:204-207).
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